Persistence of the gender pay differential in a transition economy by Adamchik, V.A. (Vera) & Bedi, A.S. (Arjun Singh)
PERSISTENCE OF THE GENDER PAY DIFFERENTIAL
IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY
Vera A. Adamchika
and
Arjun S. Bedi
a Department of Economics, Lehigh University, 621 Taylor Street, Bethlehem PA, 18015 USA, e-mail:
vaa2@lehigh.edu
We thank the Central and East European Economic Research Center at Warsaw University, Poland for
providing us with the data and Niek de Jong for helpful discussions.
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe's longest-established centre of higher education and
research in development studies. Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week
diploma courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a
scientific basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of
ISS is disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and
working papers.  The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks
to elicit comments and generate discussion. The series includes the research of staff, PhD
participants and visiting fellows, and outstanding research papers by graduate students.
For further information contact:
ORPAS - Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776
2502LT The Hague - The Netherlands - FAX: +31 70 4260799
E-mail: workingpapers@iss.nl
ISSN 0921-0210
Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author:
1CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................1
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING...............................................................3
2.1 Legal Framework ......................................................................................3
2.2 Wage Setting Institutions..........................................................................4
3. DATA.............................................................................................................5
4. WOMEN’S RELATIVE WAGES.................................................................6
5. METHODOLOGY.........................................................................................7
6. DECOMPOSITION OF THE WAGE GAP ................................................10
6.1 Specification of the Earnings Equation...................................................10
6.2 Comparing Different Decomposition Schemes ......................................11
6.3 Impact of Human Capital and Personal Characteristics .........................12
6.4 Impact of Job Characteristics..................................................................14
6.5 Impact of the Choice of Reference Category..........................................15
6.6 Selection Bias..........................................................................................16
6.7 Distribution of Wage Gaps .....................................................................19
7. DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................20
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................26
REFERENCES.................................................................................................27
TABLES AND CHARTS ................................................................................31
0ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the relative economic welfare
of women during the transition process. In order to answer this question we provide a
detailed account of the male-female wage differential and its dynamics in Poland over
the period 1993-1997. We investigate which factors influence this wage gap and the
extent to which this gap may be attributed to differences in observable characteristics
and to differences in returns to the same characteristics.  Regardless of the methodol-
ogy used or the specification estimated we find that (i) there is almost no change in
the extent of the gender wage gap at the mean or at different percentiles of the earn-
ings distribution,  (ii) most of the explained portion of the wage gap may be attributed
to industrial and occupational segregation, and (iii) a substantial portion of the wage
gap remains unexplained. In the final section of the paper we examine the underlying
factors that may drive the results.
JEL Codes: J31, Wage differentials, P2 Labor markets in transition economies
Keywords:  Poland, Gender differentials, Wages
11. INTRODUCTION
The relative economic welfare of women is one of the measures of a nation’s
well-being. However, this issue is often overlooked while measuring the success of
economic transformation in post-communist countries. While it is well known that by
1998, after several years of economic turmoil, Poland finally achieved macro-
economic stabilization and surpassed its pre-transition level of output, it is not clear
whether the economic situation of Polish women has improved along with the positive
economic performance of the country.
There are several indicators that may be examined in order to assess the eco-
nomic situation of women. Wages are probably among the most important determi-
nants of economic well-being and of personal success. In particular, the male-female
pay differential affects the position of women in the labor market as well as the status
and power of women within the household. So far relatively little academic attention
has been devoted to a systematic examination of how gender earnings differentials
have evolved during the transition process in Poland 1 as well as in other post-
communist economies.2 Despite the limited academic attention, the popular press and
non-governmental organizations have often raised the importance of analyzing pay
differences across genders in the labor market.3 An assessment of this sort is impor-
tant as relatively lower wage rates for women may generate a wide spectrum of nega-
tive consequences.
First, lower wage rates for women may increase the economic dependence of
women on their male partners, which in turn may increase their susceptibility to do-
mestic  violence.4  Violence  against women at home has long-term  negative implica-
                                                
1 Pailhe (2000) uses 1992 data from several Central European countries including Poland to examine
gender wage gaps.  In addition, one section in the UNICEF (1999) project provides an overview of
gender wage differentials in all post-communist countries.
2 Reilly (1999) and Ogloblin (1999) examine the gender wage gap in Russia between 1992 and 1996.
Paternostro and Sahn (1999) examine this issue using 1994 data from Romania.
3 For example, Warsaw Voice, an English language newspaper published in Warsaw, frequently con-
tains stories on gender issues. Furthemore, the Polish Women’s Rights Center, Center for the Ad-
vancement of Women and the Center for Social Research, focus specifically on the position of women
in society.
4 Nowakowska (2000) reports that 18 (62) percent of married (divorced) Polish women polled by the
Public Opinion Research Center admitted to being victims of domestic violence, of which 9 (41) per-
cent were repeatedly beaten by their husbands, and the other 9 (21) percent were beaten sporadically
during the relationship. According to Nowakowska’s estimates, almost half of all Polish women know
personally or have heard of women who are beaten by their husbands, and approximately one in six
Polish women live in an abusive environment. The author also reports that domestic violence occurs
more frequently in low-income families.
2tions on their health as well as work performance. Moreover, women in lower-paid
and lower-status jobs (especially in the gray economy where working conditions are
unmonitored and unregulated) are more likely to be exposed to sexual harassment in
the workplace.5
Second, about 11 percent of Polish women are single mothers and are the sole
wage earners in their families. According to a UNICEF project, the general divorce
rate 6 in Poland increased from 13.4 in 1993 to 20.8 in 1997; and the number of chil-
dren involved in divorce rose from 28.4 thousand to 44.6 thousand, respectively
(UNICEF, 1999, p.129). While, compared to other countries in transition, Poland ex-
hibits moderate divorce rates, a large number of children involved in divorce indicates
that the likelihood of divorce is greater for couples with more children. Also, the
UNICEF project reports that in Poland “the number of children living in single-parent
families rose by more than 100,000 between 1988 and 1995, with almost 12 percent
of children living with single mothers (while only 1 percent were living with single
fathers)” (p.49). For single mothers, adverse labor market outcomes combined with
less accessible childcare are likely to enhance the probability that their families live in
poverty.
Third, gender differences at the work place are transformed into inequality af-
ter retirement. While the methods for computing the retirement payments are the same
for men and women7, shorter employment periods8 and lower earnings of women
during their working life lead to lower retirement payments.  Since, on average,
women live longer than men 9, they are more likely to fall into poverty in their old
age.
Motivated, in part, by the reasons outlined above, the primary objective of the
paper is to assess the relative economic welfare of women during the transition proc-
ess. In order to answer this question we provide a detailed account of the male-female
                                                
5 The surveys show that on average 1-2 percent (Chappell and Di Martino, 1998) to 4-6 percent
(Nowakowska, 2000) of Polish women were victims of sexual incidents at workplace. However, it is
possible that these figures do not reflect the real number of sexual harassment incidents in Poland.
6 Number of divorces per hundred marriages.
7 The method used to compute the level of retirement payments is the same for men and women. It is
based on the total number of months worked and the salary of the individual.
8 The retirement age in Poland is 60 for women and 65 for men. Wóycicka and Dominiczak (2000) cite
the findings reported in “Nowe Ubezpeczenia” (New Insurance) in January 1999 that because of this
five-year difference in the retirement age a woman earning the same salary as her male counterpart will
receive about 62 percent of his pension.
9 Female life expectancy at birth in Poland is about 77 years for women and about 67 years for men.
3wage differential and its dynamics in Poland over the period 1993-1997. We investi-
gate which factors influence this wage gap and the extent to which this gap may be
attributed to differences in observable characteristics and to differences in returns to
the same characteristics.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses gender related institu-
tional and wage setting issues for the Polish labor market. Section 3 contains a short
description of the data set that we use. Section 4 provides a descriptive account of
gender wage differentials. Section 5 outlines our methodology. We present our find-
ings in section 6, Section 7 contains a discussion of the results, and the final section
concludes the paper.
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
This section reviews various institutional features of the Polish labor market
that may have a bearing on the male-female wage differential. In particular, the dis-
cussion focuses on equal opportunity laws and wage setting institutions.
2.1. Legal Framework
Based on Marxian theories of women’s emancipation, state socialism postu-
lated that a necessary and sufficient condition for women’s emancipation and conse-
quent economic independence from men lay in participation in social production
(Einhorn, 1993).  To support this ideological principle, like other former socialist
countries, the Soviet-era Polish constitution contained numerous provisions that were
geared towards promoting equal rights for women.  For instance, Article 67 guaran-
teed equal rights to all Polish citizens and Article 78 specifically stated that “women
have equal rights with men in all spheres of state, political, economic, social and cul-
tural life.” Among others, the guarantees for women’s equality were based upon the
equal with men right to work and to remuneration – “equal pay for equal work.”
The new Polish Constitution adopted in 1997 reinforced the guarantees of
equality between men and women. The new constitution states that “men and women
have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and promotion, and
                                                
10 Pailhe’s (2000) work on gender wage gaps in Poland focuses on a single year, 1992, and uses a dif-
ferent source of data.  As pointed out by the author “further research seems indispensable in order to
analyse the evolution of discrimination during the transition”.   Our work is geared mainly towards this
issue.
4have the right to equal pay for work of equal value” (Part 2 of Article 33). Poland’s
new Labor Code also addresses gender-specific issues and states that “all employees
equally performing the same job have equal rights; this concerns especially the equal
treatment of women and men” (Article 11.2) and that “any discrimination in employ-
ment based on gender … is prohibited” (Article 11.3). To further strengthen equal-
opportunity and anti-discrimination laws, Poland has ratified numerous ILO conven-
tions, including Numbers 100 and 110, and all UN and European Human Rights
Treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women.
2.2. Wage Setting Institutions
One of the most noticeable changes in the Polish labor market has been the
emergence of the private sector. Currently the private sector’s share in total output
and employment is about 60 percent.  While the evolution of the private sector has
created new job opportunities and new services, it has also raised new issues.  The
emergence of the private sector has led to the creation of a decentralized wage-setting
system which has replaced the previous centralized system where wages were set at
the level of the industry and were determined by negotiations between the government
and trade unions11.  Regardless of its merits or demerits there are several reasons why
a centralized system of wage setting is likely to be associated with lower gender dif-
ferentials in wages (see Blau and Kahn, 1996b).
First, a substantial part of the gender wage gap often stems from inter-industry
or inter-firm variation in wages (e.g., Groshen, 1991).  Hence, centralized systems
that reduce wage variation across industries and firms are more likely to be associated
with lower gender gaps.  Second, it is probably easier to implement and monitor
minimum-wage policies as well as gender specific-policies in a more centralized
wage setting environment.  Since the wage distribution of females is usually below
the male wage distribution, proper implementation of minimum wage policies is
likely to be associated with lower gender gaps. Finally, decentralized wage systems
are usually associated with higher levels of wage inequality. To the extent that higher
wage inequality contributes to gender wage gaps (as shown by Blau and Kahn, 1996a,
                                                
11 In the early years of the transition the government continued to impose wage controls (an excess
wage tax) on private and public enterprises. However, in 1991 private enterprises were exempted from
such a tax and in 1994 wage controls were suspended.
51996b) the emergence of a decentralized wage setting system may be expected to lead
to higher gender wage gaps. Thus, for a variety of reasons the emergence of the pri-
vate sector with a decentralized system of wage setting may be expected to be associ-
ated with an increase in gender wage differentials.
3. DATA
The data used in this paper are drawn from quarterly labor forces surveys con-
ducted by the Polish Central Statistical Office and span the years 1993-1997. These
surveys constitute the primary labor market data collection effort of the Polish gov-
ernment and are designed to provide nationally representative samples. 12  Except for
1993, where we use the February wave, surveys conducted in May of each year form
the basis for our analysis. 13  We restrict our attention to workers who are not full-time
students, are not handicapped, are aged between 18-64 (men) and 18-59 (women), and
are full-time hired employees. These different age restrictions correspond to the dif-
ferent retirement ages for men and women.  The last restriction is caused by the fact
that in the Polish Labor Force Survey only full-time hired employees answer a ques-
tion about their net monthly earnings at the main workplace, while self-employed in-
dividuals, assisting members in the family business and part-time hired employees do
not answer this question.14 For each year we have samples of between 13,500-14,500
full-time hired individuals.
While the available micro data provide us with samples of fairly large size and
permit a comparison over time, they also suffer from some drawbacks.  For some of
the years, in particular 1993 and 1997, the surveys do not provide information on
years of actual work experience. Similar to other studies in this area we use potential
experience as a proxy for actual experience.15 Another drawback of the data is that for
1993   there is no  information on the occupational affiliation of respondents, tenure at
                                                
12 The first of these surveys was conducted in May 1992. However, the initial surveys (May 92-
November 1992) are not usable due to limited information on some key variables. Differences in the
questionnaire used for these early surveys and surveys conducted in later years also limit comparabil-
ity.
13 We are forced to use data for February 1993 as the data for May 1993 are unavailable.
14 In Section 6.6 we try to control for the possibility of selection bias and examine how this bias may
affect our findings.
15 In Section 6.3 we examine whether the use of potential instead of actual experience significantly
affects our results.
6the current workplace, and firm size. This missing information, for 1993, does hinder
comparability over time.
4. WOMEN’S RELATIVE WAGES
Several authors provide estimates of wage differentials between men and
women for Central and East European countries prior to the transition.  For instance,
Kertesi and Kovai (1986, p.225) report that in 1980 women earned 20-25 percent less
than males in the same occupations. Fong and Paul (1993, pp.228-229) find that in
1988 women earned 8-44 percent less than males in the same economic sectors and
18-28 less for the same levels of education.
As suggested in the previous sections there are several forces that may exert
an impact on the direction of wage differentials during the transition period. For in-
stance, the emergence of the private sector and decentralized wage setting may be as-
sociated with higher gender wage differentials.  Moreover, relatively higher unem-
ployment rates16 and the apparent increase in relative labor force participation rates
amongst females17 may exert a downward pressure on female wages. On the other
hand the higher educational endowment as well as the more general nature of their
education18 may provide them with a relative advantage over men.  The overall im-
pact of these forces on wage differentials is difficult to disentangle.
Evidence on post-transition gender wage differentials is available from Nowa-
kowska and Swędrowska (2000) who report that in Poland in 1998 the national aver-
age salary for a woman was only 82 percent of that of a man. Among those with lower
than average salaries 75 percent were women and only 25 percent were men, while
among those with highest salaries 80 percent were men and only 20 percent were
women. The largest wage gaps were observed in the mining industry (where women
earn 63 percent of men’s salaries) and in trade, repairs, and financial intermediaries
                                                
16 According to OECD (1998) statistics, the ratio of women to men’s unemployment rate was 123.8
percent in 1993 and rose to 137.8 percent in 1997.  Based on our calculations, the gap is even more
pronounced rising from 120.6 percent in 1993 to 143.6 percent in 1997.  While overall unemployment
rate falls from 14.4 to 11.5 percent during this period, the increase in relative unemployment rates indi-
cates that the decline clearly favors men.
17 See Footnote 24.
18 In Poland, emphasis was placed on acquiring vocational education.  This was especially true for men
who were encouraged to acquire basic vocational skills and enter the industrial and productive sphere
of the labor market. On the other hand, women were more likely to acquire general and higher levels of
education and enter the service sector. The higher educational attainment of women may be expected to
confer an advantage to women in the new labor market (see Białecki and Heyns, 1993).
7(where women earn on average 74 percent of men’s salaries). A report by the Center
for Social Research (1996) states that 37 percent of polled women felt they were not
paid as well as men; and many women did not expect to be at the highest salary levels
at all.
In our study, we calculated the ratio of women to men’s average net monthly
earnings for full-time employees. During 1993-1997 this ratio remains quite stable
and ranges between 78.3 to 79.6 percent.  This difference appears to be similar to
wage differences that existed during the pre-transition period. In terms of international
comparisons the status of Polish women seems to be quite favorable.  Blau and Kahn
(1996b) report gender earnings ratios ranging from to 61.4 percent for the United
Kingdom to 77.3 percent for Sweden.
We also calculated an additional statistic defined as the mean percentile rank-
ing of women in the male wage distribution.  Throughout the period this number re-
mains steady and indicates that the average woman is at the 31-32 percentile of the
male earnings distribution.  The statistic indicates that in setting wages the labor mar-
ket skills of an average woman are considered similar to the skills of a man at the 31-
32 percentile of the male earnings distribution.  Once again, compared to other coun-
tries, Polish women seem to be treated relatively fairly.  According to Blau and Kahn
(1996b) this statistic ranges from 19.6 percent for Norway to 33.6 percent for Italy.
A key fact emerging from the preceding discussion is that despite the sharp
political and economic changes that have taken place in Poland, the gender wage gap
seems to be quite stable over time. Thus, in the following sections, in addition to
identifying the factors underlying the gender wage gap we also try to examine why
the gender wage gap does not exhibit much change over time.
5. METHODOLOGY
Differences in wages between males and females may arise due to differences
in observable productivity related characteristics and due to differences in the returns
to these characteristics.  The standard way of decomposing these wage differences is
to use the Blinder (1973) - Oaxaca (1973) methodology.  The traditional semi-log
earnings function may be expressed as
iii XW εβ +=ln   (1)
8where iWln is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings of a full-time employee i, iX
is a vector of observed characteristics, β  is a conformable coefficient vector to be
estimated and iε  is an error term assumed to be ),0( εσN . With suitable data in hand,
separate wage equations for males and females (male – m, female – f) may be esti-
mated and the mean log wage difference may be expressed as
ffmmfm XXWW ββ ˆˆlnln −=− ,                                                                             (2)
where mWln  and fWln  are mean log earnings, mX and fX represent the means of
observed characteristics and mβˆ and fβˆ are estimated coefficients.  This wage differ-
ence (2) may be decomposed as
ffmmfmfm XXXWW )ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnln βββ −+−=− ,  (3)
or as
mfmffmfm XXXWW )ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnln βββ −+−=− .                                (4)
The first component on the right hand side of (3) and (4) is the portion of the
wage gap explained by differences in observable characteristics, while the second
component is the portion explained by differences in returns to these characteristics.
This term also includes differences in the intercept term.  Although it is not beyond
reproach, the wage gap that persists after controlling for differences in observed char-
acteristics is treated as a measure of discrimination.19
A well known problem associated with using the decompositions represented
in (3) and (4) is that they yield different results. In (3) it is assumed that the male
wage structure prevails in the absence of discrimination while in (4) it is assumed that
the female wage structure prevails in the absence of discrimination.  One way of re-
solving this problem is to assume that the wage structure in the absence of discrimi-
nation may be approximated by equally weighting the parameters obtained from the
male and female wage regressions (see Reimers, 1984; Bedi and Garg, 2000), i.e.,
)](5.0[)ˆˆ()]ˆˆ(5.0)[(lnln fmfmfmfmfm XXXXWW +−++−=− ββββ .               (5)
While this is a possibility, Neumark (1988) suggests a more general method and pro-
poses a wage decomposition represented by
                                                
19 This term may exaggerate the extent of discrimination as it also includes the influence of gender dif-
ferences in unobserved characteristics on earnings.
9)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnln fpfpmmpfmfm XXXXWW βββββ −+−+−=− ,                            (6)
where pβˆ is the estimated non-discriminatory wage structure.  Neumark shows that
under certain conditions the appropriate non-discriminatory wage structure can be
obtained by estimating a regression over the pooled male-female sample.  Following
this approach, the observed log wage differential may be decomposed into three com-
ponents: (i) due to differences in average characteristics of males and females; (ii) due
to differences between the estimated parameters of the male wage regression and the
pooled wage regression – a male advantage or a favoritism component; (iii) due to
differences between the estimated parameters of the pooled wage equation and the
female wage equation-a female disadvantage or a pure discrimination component.20 A
priori, it may appear that the decomposition based on (6) is most appropriate. How-
ever, our approach is more cautious and for all years we decompose wage differentials
into their components on the basis of all four decomposition methods.
A final issue that bears discussion is that we estimate our regressions using
samples of men and women who participate in the labor force and are full-time hired
employees. The implicit assumptions underlying our regressions are that participating
in the labor force and working full time are randomly determined. These assumptions,
especially for women, are not likely to be correct. If women are positively selected
into the labor force and into a full-time job, then estimates that do not account for this
possibility may underestimate the extent of the gender wage gap.  While the selection
issue is potentially important in terms of assessing the extent of the wage gap, it may
not be as important in terms of comparing wage gaps over time. If the unobserved
characteristics of men and women who are labor force participants and full time em-
ployees does not change sharply during the period that we investigate then ignoring
selection effects should not have a substantial effect on our estimates.  Nevertheless,
                                                
20 Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) show that all decompositions may be expressed as
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnln *** ffmmfmfm XXXXWW βββββ −+−+−=− where *βˆ  is the estimated
nondiscriminatory wage structure. Thus, mββ ˆˆ* =  in (3) and fββ ˆˆ* =  in (4);
2/)ˆˆ(ˆ* fm βββ += in (5); pββ ˆˆ* =  in (6). Consequently, the results of the decomposition may be
quite sensitive to the choice of *βˆ . Although we present estimates which decompose the unexplained
differential into favoritism and pure discrimination, in general, we interpret the total unexplained dif-
ferential as a measure of discrimination.
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in the next section we present the methodology and estimate specifications that ac-
count for selection effects.
6. DECOMPOSITION OF THE WAGE GAP
6.1. Specification of the Earnings Equation
In order to facilitate comparison over time, our initial specification of the
earnings equation is a parsimonious one limited by what is available to us for all years
in our analysis. We start with a basic set of regressors which includes conventional
human capital characteristics (education, potential experience), personal characteris-
tics (marital status, head of the household) as well as variables that capture regional
labor market conditions (region, city/town size or village). We refer to this specifica-
tion of the earnings equation as Specification A.
We do not include any current job characteristics (such as, industrial affilia-
tion, occupation, firm size, private or public sector) in specification A. The inclusion
of job characteristics in an earnings specification may be criticized on several
grounds. For instance, a number of these job characteristics may be endogenous; also,
it is not clear whether different job characteristics of men and women reflect em-
ployment discrimination or differences in their tastes and preferences or both.21 Not-
withstanding these caveats, we take a cue from the literature and add a full set of job
characteristics to our specification of the earnings equation. We follow convention
and treat these job characteristics as factors explaining the wage gap between men and
women rather than a manifestation of employment discrimination. We refer to this
extended specification as Specification B.
First, in order to control for employer specific human capital, we include ten-
ure which reflects years of work experience with the current employer. Second, in or-
der to distinguish between high-paying and low-paying branches of the economy, we
introduce controls for 14 industries. Third, in order to account for the role of occupa-
tional differences in explaining the wage gap we introduce a set of 8 occupational in-
dicators. Fourth, several studies have reported that wages and firm size are positively
                                                
21 Some authors insist that any supply-side variable that may affect wages should be included in the
wage equation and, thus, use job characteristics as proxies of the employee’s tastes and preferences as
well as their elasticity of supply. According to this point of view, the human capital specification of the
wage equation could overestimate the extent of gender discrimination. On the other hand, others argue
that the job-related differences may reflect discrimination and demand-side barriers to entry; and the
inclusion of job characteristics into the earnings equation could underestimate gender discrimination.
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correlated (e.g., Oi, 1990). If men tend to work in larger firms then a part of the wage
gap may be attributed to firm size. In addition, according to Joshi and Paci (1998), it
is more difficult to achieve full information on individual productivity in larger firms,
therefore, the firm size may be used as a proxy for the extent to which an employer
operates internal market. To allow for this we include a set of four firm-size variables.
Fifth, wages in Poland may vary across the public and private sectors (see Adamchik
and Bedi, 2000). If women are more likely to work in the public sector then a part of
the wage gap may be explained by sector affiliation rather than gender. To allow for
this we include an indicator for the public sector of work. This dummy may also serve
as a control for the lower degree of flexibility in the pay structure in this sector (Joshi
and Paci, 1998).
A list of the variables used in the earnings equations is presented in Table A1.
Also, Table A1 shows the means of the explanatory variables and the regression re-
sults for one of the years in our study (1997, Specification B).
6.2. Comparing Different Decomposition Schemes
As column 1 in Table 1 shows, over the period 1993-1997 the mean log wage
gap remains in a narrow band between 0.218 and 0.230. Decomposition of the mean
log wage differential carried out on the basis of all four methods discussed in the pre-
vious section for both specifications of the earnings equation is summarized in Table
1 and Charts 1 and 2.
There are several clear patterns that are discernible from these results. First,
although the explained portion varies across methods, the percentage of the wage gap
that is explained by differences in observed characteristics is quite limited. Second,
looking across the various decomposition methods we see that for each year the ex-
plained portion of the wage gap is substantially higher for Method 4 as compared to
the other methods.22  For Specification A, a wage decomposition carried out on the
basis of Methods 1-3 would attribute almost the entire wage differential to differences
in returns to the same endowments, while Method 4 would attribute only 71-81 per-
cent of the wage differential to differences in rewards. The inclusion of additional
variables (Specification B) increases the explanatory power of the wage equation and,
                                                
22 A similar relationship between different decomposition schemes is reported by Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994) and Paternostro and Sahn (1999).
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correspondingly, the explained portion of the wage gap increases for all four methods.
Still, Method 4 produces the largest explained portion of the male-female wage dif-
ferential, namely 53-60 percent.
Taking a conservative approach, we base our further discussion on the method
with the largest explained portion of the male-female wage gap, that is, on Method 4.
The summary of the decompositions based on Method 4 for Specifications A and B is
presented in Table 2 and illustrated by Chart 3. The detailed decompositions are pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 4. Chart 4 helps visualize the relative impact of different com-
ponents on the log wage differential for one of the years in our study (1997, Specifi-
cation B).
6.3 Impact of Human Capital and Personal Characteristics
The decomposition results based on Specification A (see Tables 2, 3 and Chart
3) show that between 1993-1995 about 27-29 percent of the wage gap is explained by
differences in human capital endowments and personal (mostly family) characteris-
tics.  This explained portion falls to around 24 percent in 1996 and to about 19 percent
in1997. Across all years, most of the observed differences in the wage gap may be
attributed to family characteristics. In fact, marital status and whether an individual is
head of the household are the only factors among the observed characteristics that fa-
vor men over women. Although their effect is small, all other characteristics such as
education, potential experience, and regional distribution work towards reducing
wage differences between men and women.
Different rewards for the same endowments appear to be responsible for a
majority of the wage gap.  The unexplained portion varies from 71-73 percent in
1993-1995 to about 76 percent in 1996 and to about 81 percent in 1997. Across these
years, the portion of the wage difference that may be thought of as a male advantage
(female disadvantage) remains stable at between 43-44 (55-56) percent. In terms of
individual components women receive higher returns to education and experience.
Thus, in addition to a wage advantage due to their higher educational attainment
women reap higher rewards to their education. The overall effects of potential experi-
ence and being a household head also favors women. Looking across the years a con-
sistent feature is that there are only two variables that seem to be associated with the
13
pronounced male wage advantage and female disadvantage – marital status and the
intercept.23
As mentioned above, in order to achieve comparability over time, our specifi-
cation of the earnings equation includes only those variables that are available for all
years under examination. The questionnaire of the Labor Force Surveys as well as the
classifications used changed between 1993 and 1997. For instance, between 1994 and
1996 respondents were asked about the total number of years they had worked during
their lifetime. In 1993 this question was not in the survey, and, this question was
eliminated from the Labor Force Survey in 1997. Due to lack of data on experience
for the entire time period we use potential and not actual work experience. However,
potential work experience may be a very inaccurately measured variables especially
for women.
In order to examine the effect of using potential experience instead of actual
experience we re-estimate our earnings equations and carry out wage decomposition
for the years that we do have data on actual work experience (i.e. 1994-1996). These
results are presented in Table A2. A comparison of actual and potential experience
shows that the average actual experience of women is about 3 years shorter than their
average potential experience, while for men the difference is about 2 years. The sub-
stitution of actual for potential experience marginally increases the explanatory power
(R2) of the earnings equation for women but for men it does not make any difference.
Further, comparing Specification A and A-1, we observe that gender differences in
actual experience is associated with widening the pay differential, while gender dif-
ferences in potential experience work in the opposite direction. Despite this noticeable
change, the substitution of actual for potential experience does not affect the overall
decomposition and the explained and unexplained portions of the wage gaps are al-
most the same.  Overall, while  actual experience  is a more precise measure of female
                                                
23 The effect of other variables such as the location dummies appears to vary across time.  For instance,
in 1995 these variables seem to be associated with exacerbating wage differentials while in 1997 they
seem to have the opposite effect.
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work experience, given the strong labor force attachment of women in Poland 24, we
may conclude that the use of potential experience does not have a substantial effect on
the decomposition of male-female earnings differentials.
To conclude our discussion on the impact of human capital and personal char-
acteristics, we turn to the wage decomposition based on Specification B (see Table 4
and Chart 4). The results show that the effect of these characteristics is similar to the
results from our earlier Specification A. That is, among the observed characteristics,
education, potential experience, and place of residence favor women over men. Over-
all, different rewards to education and experience favor women, while different re-
wards to marital status and position in the family tend to favor men.
6.4 Impact of Job Characteristics
The inclusion of the additional variables increases the explanatory power of
the wage equation from approximately 30-35 percent to approximately 40-45 percent.
Correspondingly, the explained portion of the wage gap increases (compared to Speci-
fication A) and constitutes about 40 percent in 1993 25, about 60 percent in 1994 and
1995, and about 53 percent in 1996 and 1997. Although the unexplained portion of
the wage gap falls it is still quite substantial.
Amongst the job characteristics, industrial affiliation followed by the occupa-
tional affiliation of women are the two main factors responsible for widening the
wage gap. At the same time, the portion of the wage gap that may be attributed to dif-
ferences in coefficients on the industry and occupations variables is small.  Except for
differences in the estimated coefficients on the baseline industry and occupation
(captured by the intercept) it seems that despite the higher proportion of men in higher
paying industries and occupations, within industries and occupations women may not
experience lower wages.
                                                
24 Although there has been a decline in labor force participation (LFP) for both men and women in all
transition countries, at least in Poland this reduction does not seem to have disproportionately affected
women.  In fact, according to Paukert (1995), between 1989 and 1994 women’s labor force participa-
tion rates in Poland declined less than men’s (respectively, 4.4 versus 7.8 percent). Consequently, the
ratio of women to men’s LFP rates seems to have increased from 76.7 percent (Wehmeyer, 1999) in the
pre-transition period to around 81-83 percent in the post-transition period (OECD, 1998). Thus, during
the period covered by our data it appears that the commitment of women to the labor force has not di-
minished.
25 For 1993, the information on occupation, tenure, and firm size is not available in the Labor Force
Survey.
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A look at the estimated coefficients on the industry and occupational variables
(Table A1) shows considerable heterogeneity across industries and occupations.  Fe-
male workers in mining and the energy industry are particularly disadvantaged, while
female workers in education, health care and the financial industry receive higher re-
turns than men.  In terms of occupational differences in rewards, women are at a dis-
advantage if they work as farmers or industrial workers but for almost all other occu-
pations they seem to be as highly rewarded if not better rewarded than men.
The impact of the public or private sector affiliation on the wage differential is
similar to that of industry and occupation: while more men work in the higher paying
private sector, within each sector women seem to receive a higher reward.   Other job
characteristics included in the earnings equation, such as tenure and the firm size, tend
to increase the male-female wage gap, however, their impacts are very small. 26
6.5 Impact of the Choice of Reference Category
The results presented above show that a substantial portion of both male ad-
vantage and female disadvantage seem to be associated with the intercept. Ascribing
wage differences to the intercept is clearly unsatisfactory, as it does not tell us which
characteristics are responsible for the substantially higher returns to males.  According
to our specification, the intercept may be interpreted as the starting salary for a un-
married worker who does not head the household, has only elementary or incomplete
elementary education, and who works as a manual worker in a small private manu-
facturing firm in the Warsaw region.  The large intercept gap suggests that the wage
gap between men and women may lie in differences between men and women who (a)
have low education, or (b) work in the manufacturing sector, or (c) are manual work-
ers, or (d) work in the private sector, or (e) work in a small firm, or (f) are not mar-
ried, (g) do not head the household, or (h) live in the Warsaw region.
To identify the source of the intercept wage gap we re-estimate Specification
B using different reference groups for 1997. For our first trial we sequentially replace
primary educated individuals as our reference group with other education groups. The
                                                
26 In 1997 the Labor Force Survey questionnaire was augmented with a question if a person completed
a training program during the preceding three months. To assess the impact of this factor on earnings,
we include a dummy variable as a proxy for the firm specific human capital and for the presence of
some form of internal market (see Felstead, 1995, Joshi and Paci, 1998). However, according to our
findings, the explanatory power of this factor is negligible with 0.000 contribution to the explained
portion of the wage gap and –0.001 contributions to both male advantage and female disadvantage.
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pattern of coefficients shows that, ceteris paribus, people with elementary or incom-
plete elementary education experience the smallest gender difference in earnings and
this difference increases with education levels.
Returning to our original reference group (individuals with primary education)
we experiment with the various industry indicators. We sequentially replace the
manufacturing industry as our reference group with each of the fifteen industrial
groups as references. The contribution of the intercept to the wage gap varies between
0.390 for the mining industry to 0.168 for agriculture as a reference. Next we experi-
ment with the occupational dummies and sequentially replace manual workers as the
reference category with each of the other occupational categories. Intercept differ-
ences using these alternative reference groups varies from 0.348 (for farmers as a ref-
erence) to 0.123 (for specialists as a reference). The range of these intercepts displays
the substantial heterogeneity of wage gaps across industries and occupations. Fur-
thermore, the pattern of coefficients on the basis of different reference categories
shows that gender wage gaps in the manufacturing sector among manual workers is
quite pronounced and is an important component of differences in the intercept. We
also experimented with alternative reference categories for firm size, city size, and
region. Without providing all the details, our experiments suggest that the wage gaps
increase with firm size, are larger in cities, and are higher in the Warsaw region as
compared to other areas.
6.6 Selection Bias
Although we have mentioned the possible effects of self-selection on our es-
timates we have not yet paid substantial attention to this problem. Our regressions and
wage decompositions are estimated over samples of men and women who are full-
time employed workers. The implicit assumptions underlying the application of ordi-
nary least squares to such a sample are that selection into the labor force and into full-
time work are randomly determined. These assumptions are unlikely to be true espe-
cially for women, and under such conditions OLS estimates of wage equations are
likely to be biased.
To address this problem we resort to methods developed by Heckman (1979)
and Vella (1993). Implementation of these methods requires the estimation of an
equation that determines the labor market status of an individual. Estimates of such an
equation are used to construct a selection correction term that may be included in
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earnings regressions to obtain consistent estimates.  Accordingly, individuals in our
sample are divided into four labor market states and an ordered probit specification is
used to estimate the probability of an individual’s labor market status.  The ordered
probit is specified as,
iii DL ϕω +=* ,                                                     (7)
where *iL  indicates the latent labor market status of an individual and iL is the ob-
served counterpart. If  0* ≤iL , 0=iL (does not participate in the labor force); if
1
*0 µ≤< iL , 1=iL (unemployed); if 2*1 µµ ≤< iL , 2=iL (part-time worker); and if
2
* µ>iL , 3=iL (full-time worker). iD  is a vector of observed characteristics; ω is a
coefficient vector to be estimated, iϕ  is assumed to be a N(0, ϕσ ) error term and the
µ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated with ω . Based on the assumption that
the error terms in the earnings equation (1) and in the ordered probit equation (7) has
a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and correlation ρ  a selection correc-
tion term,
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is constructed and included in our earnings regressions functions. Expected log earn-
ings conditional on working full-time maybe expressed as,
λε βλβρσλβ iiiiii XXLWE +=+== 3) |(ln ,                                       (9)
where λi is the selection correction term and βλ is the covariance between the error
terms in the earnings and labor market status equations.  This coefficient is a measure
of the effect of the non-random sorting of individuals, while the sign indicates the
nature of the selection. Depending on the nature of the selectivity bias the observed
earnings differentials will over- or understate the differences in the selection corrected
(offered) earnings.  For instance, if there is positive selection of women into full-time
work (and no selection effects for men) then the observed earnings differential will
underestimate the differences in offered earnings between men and women.27  The
                                                
27 The selection corrected earnings differential is expressed as,
).ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)(ˆˆlnln fpfpmmpfmffmmfm XXXXWW ββββββλβλ λλ −+−+−=+−− If
women are positively selected into full-time work and there is no (or a negative) selection effect for
men then the selection corrected earnings gap will be larger than the observed earnings gap.
18
augmented wage equation (9) is estimated using OLS and a wage decomposition is
carried out on the basis of these selection corrected earnings equation estimates.28
It is well known that procedures such as the one outlined here are sensitive to
the distributional assumptions and the specification of both the selection and the wage
equations (see Manski, 1989).  In order to reduce this sensitivity, we would like to
have several variables that influence the selection decision but do not influence earn-
ings. At the very least, to achieve identification, we need at least one variable that in-
fluences labor market status but may be excluded from the wage equation. We esti-
mate the labor market status equation using a specification that includes education,
age, marital status, an indicator for head of household, variables indicating labor mar-
ket conditions (macro geographical regions), place of residence (big city or rural), and
our identifying variable -  i.e., a dummy variable indicating whether an individual en-
tered the labor market after 1989 (new regime).29 The specification of the earnings
equation includes all the variables from Specification B and the selection correction
term, lambda. We refer to this specification as Specification C.
The ordered probit estimates (see Table A3 for results using the 1997 data)
show that for both men and women the probability of participating in the labor force,
and participating full-time, are positively associated with education. Marriage has a
positive (negative) and significant effect on male (female) participation. Living in
economically undeveloped regions, especially the north and the north-east, increases
the chance of not being in the labor force; and it seems that there are more employ-
ment opportunities (especially for men) in big cities. The “new regime” variable is
positive and statistically significant for both men and women. This suggests that more
recent entrants into the labor force are more likely to belong to the labor force and are
also more likely to be fully employed. The estimates of Specification C are not sub-
stantially different from those of Specification B; thus, we present only estimated co-
                                                
28 Rather than using a single ordered probit specification to estimate the labor market status of indi-
viduals we may use a sequential approach and estimate the probability of participating in the labor
market (a probit specification) and subsequently the probability of working full-time, part-time or being
unemployed (an ordered probit specification). The use of this two-step approach further complicates
the identification problem.  Nevertheless, we used identifying restrictions to estimate such a model.
The selection effects using this approach are positive and statistically significant for both men and
women. Similar to the results based on the one-step approach, the overall selection effect suggests that
the observed wage gap underestimates the offered wage differential.  Detailed results are available.
29 The idea behind this variable is that individuals entering the labor market after 1989 faced a different
set of labor market conditions that those who entered before 1989.  Further details on the validity and
identifying power of this variable may be found in Adamchik and Bedi (2000).
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efficients on the selection term lambda (see Table 2). For both men and women, we
find that the coefficient on the selection correction term is positive and statistically
significant. The sign pattern indicates that both men and women are positively se-
lected and have higher wage offers than those not working full-time.
Decomposition results for Specification C are summarized in Table 2 and
Chart 3. The detailed results are presented in Table 5; and Chart 5 shows the relative
contribution of each factor for one of the years in our study, 1997.  The results show
that for almost all years (except 1996) the selection effect works towards reducing the
observed wage gap between men and women. This implies that in the absence of a
selection correction the observed wage gap underestimates the true gender wage dif-
ferential. Despite this change in the extent of the wage gap, our conclusions about the
various factors influencing the wage gap, drawn from Specification B, remains largely
unperturbed. The additional information yielded by the selection correction is that the
observed wage gap for the sample of full-time hired employees may be viewed as a
lower bound for the potential (offered) wage differential in the Polish labor market.
6.7 Distribution of Wage Gaps
It is clear that over time the wage gap has not changed.  Not only is the overall
wage gap stable, but the decomposition of the wage gap and the relative importance
of the individual components remains stable throughout the period. Despite the appar-
ent stability it is possible that gender wage gaps at different percentiles of the wage
earnings distribution may have registered sharp changes while leaving the mean un-
changed. To examine this potential heterogeneity we examine changes in the gender
wage gap at various percentiles of the wage distribution as well as patterns of wage
growth at all percentiles.
Table 6 presents a summary of the gender wage gap at different percentiles of
the wage distribution.  These results are obtained from OLS and quantile regressions
of log wages on a constant and a male indicator variable and are estimated for all
years.  Looking across the various percentiles the estimates suggest that females at the
lower end of the earnings distribution (at the 10th and 25th percentiles) face a smaller
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wage gap as compared to those at the upper end.30 This pattern prevails for all years.
A comparison across years shows that except for a decline in the wage gap at the low-
est percentiles (10th and the 25th percentile) there are no substantial changes at any of
the other percentiles.31
The regressions we have estimated are at particular points of the wage distri-
bution but do not provide information on movements in the wage gap between these
percentiles.  To get an idea of changes at all points of the wage distribution we ex-
amine wage growth for males and females at all percentiles.  Chart 6 presents a graph
of log wage growth at various percentiles. For males and females the pattern of wage
growth is U-shaped.  Earnings growth seems to be higher at the two ends of the distri-
butions and less pronounced in the middle. We observe higher wage growth for fe-
males at the lower end (0-10th percentile) while at other percentiles, especially beyond
the median there does not seem to be a clear pattern favoring either group.
The regression results and the graph reveal the same story.  They both show
that there is some heterogeneity in patterns of wage growth and wage gaps across per-
centiles.  However, except for the higher wage growth and the resulting decline in
wage gaps at the lower tail, gender differences in wage growth and consequently
changes in wage gaps across various percentiles are quite modest.
7. DISCUSSION
Our investigation of gender wage differentials during the 1990s has revealed
three main empirical regularities.  First, there seem to have been almost no change in
the extent of the gender wage gap. Second, most of the explained wage gap may be
attributed to industrial and occupational segregation. Third, despite the inclusion of
human capital variables and job characteristics the unexplained portion of the wage
gap remains between 40-50 percent. In this section we discuss each of these facts and
speculate on the factors that underlie them.
                                                
30 For 1997, statistical tests show that there are no significant differences between the coefficients at
the 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.  However, the coefficients at the 10th and the 25th percentile are sig-
nificantly different from each other and from the coefficients at the other percentiles.
31 A formal statistical test for differences between the coefficients at the 10th percentile in 1993 and
1997 has a p-value of 0.0017. A similar test for the coefficients at the 25th percentile has a p-value of
0.0244.  For all other percentiles there appears to be no statistical difference between the 1993 and
1997 coefficients.
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The stability of the gender wage gap, despite the sharp political and economic
changes in Poland, suggests that these changes may have had a very small impact on
factors that play a role in determining gender wage gaps. To provide support for this
argument we examine the pattern of change in factors that we have identified as im-
portant associates of the gender wage gap.
According to our analysis gender differences in educational endowment work
towards reducing wage gaps while gender differences in industrial and occupational
affiliation exacerbate wage differentials.  Considering educational endowment, it is
well known and also corroborated by our data that women in Poland are generally
better educated than men.  This feature is largely a consequence of the policies of the
previous era where men were encouraged to acquire vocational education and work in
the productive (manufacturing) sector of the economy while women carried on to
higher education levels and worked in the non-productive (services) sphere of the
economy. In terms of temporal variation, between 1993 and 1997 (see Table 7) there
are hardly any changes in the relative educational distribution of men and women and
consequently the influence of this factor on gender pay gaps remains stable.32
Tables 8 and 9 present the occupational and industrial distribution by gender.
Average wages in each occupation and industry are also provided.  The tables show
that there is crowding of women into certain industries and occupations. For example,
in 1997 women were predominant (industries with a female-male ratio greater than 3)
in the health care, education, hotel and restaurant business, and financial and insur-
ance industry.  Except for the financial industry (which employs a small fraction of
the total population), average wages in industries dominated by women are far below
the sample average. Jobs done mainly by women are office clerks and services work-
ers. Almost 35 percent of females and only about 9 percent of males were in these oc-
cupations.
                                                
32 Whether the trend of higher educational endowment among women will persist is open to debate.  In
recent years the Polish Catholic Church and the conservative parliamentary majority appear to be sup-
porting a more traditional role for women (Wóycicka and Dominiczak, 2000).  In part, as a result of
these efforts, several recent surveys show that a substantial number of Poles believe in a more tradi-
tional role for women. Forty percent of the respondents believed that the principal area of women’s
activities should be the family and household (Domański, 1995); 70 percent of respondents felt that
women can only achieve fulfillment as mothers and 33 percent felt that a university education is more
important for men than for women (Siemieńska, 1998). Further, 80 percent of the polled considered
housework as their exclusive duty (Dabic, 1994); and 40 percent of women believed that the wife must
take care of the family while the husband must earn living (Domański, 1995).
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As our results suggest and the table shows, “feminized” industries and occu-
pations usually have lower than average wages and, hence, a large portion of the ex-
plained wage gap may be attributed to differences in industrial and occupational af-
filiation. We measure the extent of industrial and occupational segregation using an
index that equals the percentage of men or women who would have to change jobs in
order to equalize the industrial/occupational distribution. The industrial segregation
index is computed across fifteen industries while the occupational segregation index
is computed across nine occupational categories. The magnitude of these both indices
remains very stable throughout the period under examination. The industrial segrega-
tion index remains between 33-35 percent while occupational segregation remains
unchanged at around 46 percent.
Why are industrial and occupational distributions so stable? It is possible that
industrial and occupational segregation reflects different preferences of men and
women as well as different supply elasticities. In this case, women’s strong prefer-
ences for particular jobs leads to crowding and leads them to accept a lower pay in a
relatively small number of industries and occupations. However, it is quite likely that
gender based education and specialization along with protective regulations are more
important factors responsible for the rigid industrial and occupational distributions in
Poland.
As our earlier discussion pointed out, men and women are encouraged to fol-
low different educational tracks at an early age. The idea of different social roles for
men and women seems to be a deeply rooted feature in Poland (see, for example,
Firkowska-Mankiewicz, 1995, Białecki, 1997). These beliefs transform into sharply
divergent educational tracks for men and women, which in turn shapes the industrial
and occupational segregation that prevails in Poland. Wóycicka and Dominiczak
(2000) report that the stereotyped gender biased specialization in Poland starts as
early as the primary level (where educational programs are organized according to the
traditional perception of what is “masculine” and “feminine”) and continues at higher
levels (where women’s access to certain industries and occupations is limited by gen-
der quotas)33.
                                                
33 According to the enrollment numbers reported by Wóycicka and Dominiczak (2000), the male-
female ratio is about 3 in secondary technical schools and about 0.03 in secondary medical schools. In
addition, secretarial, nurses, and teachers colleges are almost entirely dominated by women.
23
Furthermore, the Labor Code explicitly prohibits the employment of women in
jobs particularly harmful to their health. Until September 1996 the Labor Code
banned women from more than 90 occupations. Although this code was amended in
September 1996 and eased the access of women to many occupations, the list of pro-
hibited jobs still remains rather long.  Whether the government should protect
women’s health and their reproductive functions or each woman should have the right
to make her own decisions concerning her health is open to debate. However, it is
clear that the protective regulations cause Polish women to be banned from a number
of occupations and industries and promotes segregation.
Thus, it seems quite likely that crowding of women into certain industries and
occupations may reflect not only their preferences but also both “pre-entry” discrimi-
nation (differential access to education and training) and “post-entry” discrimination
(when women are restricted from entering certain occupations).  While these distribu-
tions may eventually change it is clear that between the period 1993-1997 the indus-
trial and occupational structures were inert and are probably similar to the distribu-
tions that prevailed in the pre-transition era.  Overall, given that there has been virtu-
ally no change in the education, industrial or occupational distribution across genders
it is not surprising that the explained portion of the wage gap remains stable.
We now turn to the “unexplained” portion of the wage gap. It is quite large
and also remains stable during this period.  Since we have taken into account the ef-
fects of differences in observed characteristics, this “unexplained” portion of the wage
gap may reflect a pure “taste for discrimination” in the Polish labor market.  There
were two main factors that showed sharply differing returns (i.e. the coefficients)
across genders: the intercept and marital status.
As indicated in Section 6.5, the intercept represents a mixture of reference
characteristics. The exercise in the previous section showed that the intercept wage
gap may not be attributed to gender differences in starting wages amongst those with
low educational levels but is associated with differences in starting wages for manual
workers in large manufacturing firms in urban areas. These gender differences in
starting wages may reflect a “taste for discrimination” or may be due to unobserved
qualities that increase the suitability of men for jobs in such sectors (e.g. physical
strength).  While the exact source of these differences is not clear, what is clear is that
the factors that underlie these differences in stating wages do not change during the
period that we investigate.
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Marital status appears to be an important factor associated with the higher
male wage, ceteris paribus.34 Throughout the period under examination, married men
seem to be earning a large wage premium as compared to married women.35 What
explains the differential marriage premium across genders? There might be several
explanations for this finding.
First, earnings differentials may arise due to productivity differences (Becker,
1985, Hakim, 1996). According to this rather literal view, marriage increases the pro-
ductivity of men. The basic idea is that marriage is associated with increased respon-
sibilities in terms of supporting a family and motivates men to work harder and boosts
productivity.  For women, marriage is associated with a rising burden of domestic du-
ties and child-care and may reduce the level of effort that they are able to put into paid
jobs. If prospective employers perceive that family responsibilities (especially child
care) lower the productivity of women or increase its variability around a common
average, then they may offer married women lower wages leading to statistical dis-
crimination.
The increased child-care and family responsibilities that a woman’s marital
status signals are accentuated by existing legislation.  There are a variety of maternity
leave and child care provisions in Poland. Under the Polish Labor Code, a pregnant
woman cannot be fired and she should be transferred to another position if her regular
job is in any way harmful. She has the right to paid leave in order to undergo medical
check-ups. A woman who gives birth or adopts a baby has the right to paid (100 per-
cent of her salary) maternity leave for 16 to 26 weeks. 36 Moreover, maternity leave is
obligatory and an employer is punishable if a new mother returns to work earlier than
regulations allow. Once the maternity period ends, a mother37 is entitled to a 3-year
                                                
34 This result and the pattern of estimated coefficients on the marital status variable are similar to find-
ings based on data from other countries. For example, Korenman and Neumark (1991) report that mar-
riage premiums appear slowly after marriage and result from faster wage growth for married men as
compared to never-married men. While their study supports the idea that marriage enhances productiv-
ity, the mechanism linking marriage to productivity is not clear.
35 For instance, based on a review of research using data from the United States, Korenman and Neu-
mark (1991) report that the marital status coefficient for men is usually large and positive while for
women the coefficient is usually close to zero. Paternostro and Sahn (1999) report a similar result in
their paper that uses 1994 data from Romania.
36 It is worth noting that in September 1999, the Polish parliament (Seim and Senate) amended regula-
tions and extended maternity leave to 6 months. While this information is irrelevant to the period under
consideration in our study, it shows that the protective regulations in Poland are generous.
37 Although, men rarely make use of the right, since 1996 both parents, if employed, are equally enti-
tled to the childcare leave.
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child care leave. During this period her employment cannot be dissolved, and when a
woman returns from such a leave her employer is obliged to provide her with an
equivalent position and a salary that cannot be lower than before the leave. Finally, a
woman is entitled to 2 paid days of childcare leave per year till her children are 14 as
well as to paid sick child care leave.
Such an extensive list of provisions in the Polish Labor Code is likely to have
an adverse effect on the employment and salary prospects of married women. The
possibility of a half-year absence from work and multiple child care leaves thereafter,
reduces the attractiveness of hiring married women.  Job offers in Poland are often
gender and age specific; and even if a job offer is gender-neutral, employers ask
women about their age, marital status, plans for the future and request a non-
pregnancy certificate or a declaration that a woman will not become pregnant for
some time (Nowakowska and Swędrowska, 2000). Since these regulations may make
it more difficult for married women to get a job, they may be willing to accept lower
paid positions.
Second, lower wages of married women may also be explained by the lower
elasticity of supply of married women because domestic responsibilities usually re-
duce mobility, increase the cost of potential job search, and may motivate women to
trade wages for a more convenient working schedule. Third, marital status and earn-
ings may be endogenous.  Unobserved characteristics that determine martial status
may be correlated with unobserved characteristics that determine wages.  Nakosteen
and Zimmer (1987) and Rupert and Cornwell (1997) provide some evidence to sup-
port this theory. Fourth, the marriage premium may be motivated by norms or un-
written institutional considerations.  It is possible that post-marriage, firms/employers
raise wages for men so that they are able to raise a family.
While any one or a combination of the possibilities mentioned above could
apply to the Polish case, the most likely explanation is that a women’s marital status is
interpreted as a signal of increased family responsibilities, limited flexibility and
lower productivity by employers. This feature combined with the high costs that are
imposed by protective legislation (maternity and child care leave) reduces the em-
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ployment prospects of married women and reduces the level of wages that they can
command.38
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we examined the gender wage gap in Poland during the 1990s.
The empirical analysis showed that during this period the mean gender wage gap re-
mained unchanged and except for a reduction at the lower tail remained stable
throughout the wage distribution.  The mean gender wage gap of about 21-22 percent
is in the same range as indicated by the pre-transition literature.
Depending on the year, a wage gap decomposition showed that between 40 to
60 percent of the wage differential could be explained by differences in observed
characteristics across genders.  Most of these differences were attributed to household
position and the industrial and occupational affiliation of women. The stereotypical
perception of women having a specific role in the labor market persists and this view
determines the type of education that women acquire and the occupations and indus-
tries that they enter.  This perception is echoed and/or supported by labor legislation
which prevents women from working in occupations and sectors which are considered
inimical to their health.  Although the effect of industrial and occupational segrega-
tion on wages forms part of the so-called explained portion of the wage gap, it may be
more appropriately viewed as a consequence of pre- and post-labor market discrimi-
nation based on gender stereotyping.
The large unexplained portion of the wage gap is attributed to gender differ-
ences in starting salaries and in returns to marital status. Although the unexplained
part of the wage gap is conventionally thought to measure gender discrimination, it is
possible that differences in starting wages may be associated with unobserved gender
differences in attributes that the labor market values (such as motivation, physical
strength).  While unobserved characteristics may be responsible for a portion of the
unexplained gap, once again, gender differences in returns to marital status seem to be
associated with gender stereotyping and statistical discrimination.
Despite sharp changes in the political, economic and institutional arrange-
ments in Poland, the male-female wage gap remained rather stable in terms of its
                                                
38 Pailhe (2000) provides support for this statistical discrimination story from a variety of Central and
Eastern European countries, including Poland.
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magnitude and the impact of each of the individual components. This suggests that
factors responsible for determining wage gaps between men and women or more gen-
erally determining the labor market status of women have not changed. The sterotypi-
cal perception of women belonging to certain educational, occupational and industrial
streams persists. The view that women are primarily responsible for child-care and
that this responsibility lowers their job-performance also appears to persist. Thus, it
seems that stereotypes about women are very deeply ingrained and have not been in-
fluenced, at least till now, by the systemic changes in the political and economic sys-
tem in Poland.
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Table 1. Different decompositions of the male-female wage differential
(standard errors in parentheses)a)
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
Year
Mean Log
Wage
Gap (Xm-Xf)*βm (βm-βf)*Xf (Xm-Xf)*βf (βm-βf)*Xm (Xm-Xf)*
(βm+βf)/2
(βm-βf)*
(Xm+ Xf)/2
(Xm-Xf)*β p (βm-βp)*Xm (βp-βf)*Xf
(A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Specification A. Human capital and personal characteristics
1993 0.226
(0.007)
0.014
(0.006)
0.213
(0.009)
-0.030
(0.005)
0.256
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.005)
0.234
(0.009)
0.062
(0.003)
0.072
(0.002)
0.092
(0.003)
1994 0.230
(0.006)
0.018
(0.005)
0.211
(0.009)
-0.023
(0.005)
0.253
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.232
(0.009)
0.066
(0.003)
0.071
(0.002)
0.093
(0.003)
1995 0.220
(0.006)
0.009
(0.005)
0.211
(0.009)
-0.020
(0.005)
0.240
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.225
(0.009)
0.060
(0.003)
0.070
(0.002)
0.090
(0.003)
1996 0.223
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.224
(0.009)
-0.025
(0.004)
0.248
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.005)
0.236
(0.009)
0.054
(0.003)
0.075
(0.002)
0.095
(0.003)
1997 0.218
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.223
(0.009)
-0.041
(0.004)
0.259
(0.009)
-0.023
(0.005)
0.241
(0.009)
0.041
(0.003)
0.077
(0.002)
0.100
(0.003)
Specification B. Specification A plus job characteristics
1993 b) 0.226
(0.007)
0.038
(0.004)
0.188
(0.005)
-0.021
(0.003)
0.247
(0.006)
0.009
(0.003)
0.218
(0.006)
0.091
(0.004)
0.059
(0.001)
0.076
(0.002)
1994 0.230
(0.006)
0.083
(0.007)
0.147
(0.010)
0.027
(0.008)
0.203
(0.010)
0.055
(0.007)
0.175
(0.010)
0.139
(0.004)
0.039
(0.001)
0.052
(0.004)
1995 0.220
(0.006)
0.064
(0.007)
0.156
(0.010)
0.036
(0.008)
0.184
(0.010)
0.050
(0.008)
0.170
(0.010)
0.128
(0.004)
0.040
(0.001)
0.052
(0.002)
1996 0.223
(0.006)
0.061
(0.003)
0.162
(0.008)
0.013
(0.003)
0.210
(0.010)
0.037
(0.003)
0.186
(0.009)
0.119
(0.001)
0.046
(0.003)
0.058
(0.008)
1997 0.218
(0.007)
0.068
(0.007)
0.150
(0.010)
0.010
(0.008)
0.208
(0.010)
0.039
(0.008)
0.179
(0.010)
0.115
(0.004)
0.044
(0.002)
0.058
(0.002)
Notes: a) The delta method was used to compute approximate standard errors.  b) Specification B in 1993 does not include occupation, tenure, and firm size.
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Table 2. Decomposition of the male-female wage differential, 1993-1997:
Summary, all specifications, method 4 a)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mean log wage gap 0.226 0.230 0.220 0.223 0.218
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
WAGE GAP DECOMPOSITION BASED ON
SPECIFICATION A
     Explained 0.062
 (0.003)
0.066
(0.003)
0.060
(0.003)
0.054
(0.003)
0.041
(0.003)
     Unexplained: male advantage 0.072 0.071 0.070 0.075 0.077
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
     Unexplained: female disadvantage 0.092 0.093 0.090 0.095 0.100
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Wage gap decomposition based on Specification B
     Explained 0.091 0.139 0.128 0.119 0.115
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
     Unexplained: male advantage 0.059 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.044
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
     Unexplained: female disadvantage 0.076 0.052 0.052 0.058 0.058
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Wage gap decomposition based on Specification C
    Explained 0.117 0.161 0.145 0.135 0.137
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
    Unexplained: male advantage 0.096 0.094 0.072 0.069 0.090
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
    Unexplained: female disadvantage 0.066 0.033 0.027 0.018 0.036
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002)
Total mean log wage differential adjusted for selection 0.278 0.289 0.244 0.221 0.263
Selection effect ffmm λλ βλβλ ˆˆ − -0.052 -0.059 -0.024 0.002 -0.045
λβˆ for men (std.err.) 0.230(0.073)
0.086
(0.056)
0.139
(0.054)
0.155
(0.046)
0.190
(0.053)
λβˆ for women (std.err) 0.233(0.050)
0.148
(0.038)
0.125
(0.036)
0.092
(0.034)
0.183
(0.045)
Notes: a) Standard errors in parentheses.  The delta method was used to compute standard errors for the wage decomposition coefficients.
33
Table 3. Decomposition of the male-female wage differential, 1993-1997,
based upon Specification A of the earnings equation (human capital and personal characteristics)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained
Components of the
male-female
wage
differential
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(A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Education -0.017 -0.037 -0.043 -0.022 -0.018 -0.037 -0.020 -0.023 -0.044 -0.022 -0.013 -0.026 -0.028 0.003 -0.011
Potential experience -0.001 0.032 -0.123 -0.001 0.030 -0.102 -0.001 0.035 -0.101 -0.001 0.056 -0.091 -0.001 0.031 -0.098
Married 0.005 0.010 0.045 0.004 0.018 0.044 0.003 0.024 0.042 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.002 0.005 0.028
Head of household 0.077 -0.064 0.040 0.085 -0.069 0.040 0.081 -0.068 0.034 0.077 -0.061 0.036 0.073 -0.053 0.037
Region/city/rural -0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.033 0.046 -0.004 0.011 0.014 -0.004 -0.029 -0.014
Constant 0.000 0.127 0.178 0.000 0.107 0.149 0.000 0.070 0.113 0.000 0.076 0.124 0.000 0.119 0.159
Total 0.062 0.072 0.092 0.066 0.071 0.093 0.060 0.070 0.090 0.054 0.075 0.095 0.041 0.077 0.100
Additional informat. Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
N obs. 7554 5911 8501 6440 8555 6690 8220 6488 8249 6320
R2, percent 32.1 34.5 32.9 33.0 28.7 29.3 34.2 31.7 32.0 33.4
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Table 4. Decomposition of the male-female wage differential, 1993-1997,
based upon Specification B of the earnings equation (human capital, personal characteristics, and job characteristics)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained
Components of the
male-female
wage
differential
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(A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Education -0.018 -0.042 -0.036 -0.018 -0.019 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 0.001 -0.014 -0.011 0.002 -0.023 0.001 0.023
Potential experience -0.001 0.034 -0.117 -0.001 0.009 -0.068 -0.001 0.013 -0.069 -0.001 0.035 -0.059 -0.001 0.008 -0.078
Married 0.005 0.006 0.044 0.003 0.014 0.033 0.002 0.023 0.032 0.003 0.008 0.027 0.001 0.010 0.023
Head of household 0.069 -0.047 0.036 0.058 -0.035 0.025 0.053 -0.041 0.018 0.053 -0.038 0.021 0.050 -0.030 0.023
Region/city/rural -0.001 0.006 -0.023 -0.001 -0.014 -0.029 -0.004 0.021 0.024 -0.005 0.012 0.014 -0.005 -0.026 -0.023
Industry 0.038 -0.007 -0.048 0.059 -0.012 0.014 0.061 -0.011 0.002 0.053 -0.014 -0.004 0.065 -0.014 -0.001
Occupation 0.033 -0.005 0.014 0.024 -0.044 -0.024 0.023 -0.014 0.002 0.024 -0.014 -0.014
Sector 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.001 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.001 0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.005
Tenure 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.008 -0.007 -0.002 0.006 -0.001
Firm size 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.021 0.003 -0.003 0.009
Constant 0.000 0.109 0.206 0.000 0.102 0.066 0.000 0.092 0.059 0.000 0.060 0.040 0.000 0.113 0.090
Total 0.091 0.059 0.076 0.139 0.039 0.052 0.128 0.040 0.052 0.119 0.046 0.058 0.115 0.044 0.058
Additional informat. Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
N obs. 7554 5911 8501 6440 8555 6690 8220 6488 8249 6320
R2, percent 36.5 38.0 43.1 42.7 38.8 39.3 45.0 41.3 40.8 43.0
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Table 5. Decomposition of the male-female wage differential, 1993-1997,
based upon Specification C of the earnings equation (human capital, personal characteristics, job characteristics, and selection effect)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained unexplained
Components of the
male-female
wage
differential
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(A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Education -0.021 -0.062 -0.043 -0.021 -0.043 -0.015 -0.018 -0.029 0.002 -0.017 -0.027 0.009 -0.027 -0.025 0.021
Potential experience -0.006 -0.010 -0.138 -0.004 -0.042 -0.076 -0.003 -0.022 -0.069 -0.003 0.008 -0.042 -0.002 -0.028 -0.086
Married 0.003 0.048 0.066 0.002 0.034 0.044 0.002 0.048 0.040 0.002 0.034 0.031 0.001 0.040 0.035
Head of household 0.104 -0.077 0.052 0.088 -0.068 0.037 0.077 -0.061 0.030 0.073 -0.053 0.033 0.078 -0.055 0.037
Region/city/rural -0.001 0.015 -0.017 -0.001 -0.009 -0.025 -0.005 0.028 0.025 -0.005 0.018 0.015 -0.005 -0.025 -0.023
Industry 0.037 -0.007 -0.048 0.059 -0.013 0.015 0.060 -0.011 0.002 0.053 -0.014 -0.003 0.064 -0.015 0.001
Occupation 0.034 -0.005 0.016 0.025 -0.043 -0.022 0.024 -0.013 0.002 0.025 -0.013 -0.012
Sector 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.001 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.001 0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.005
Tenure 0.000 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.013 0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0.006 -0.003 0.006 0.000
Firm size 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.022 0.003 -0.002 0.010
Constant 0.000 0.189 0.181 0.000 0.239 0.030 0.000 0.164 0.009 0.000 0.108 -0.044 0.000 0.215 0.048
Total 0.117 0.096 0.066 0.161 0.094 0.033 0.145 0.072 0.027 0.135 0.069 0.018 0.137 0.090 0.036
Selection effect a) -0.052 -0.059 -0.024 0.002 -0.045
Additional informat. Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
N obs. (earnings eqn.) 7554 5911 8501 6440 8555 6690 8220 6488 8249 6320
N obs. (probit eqn.) 11125 11854 12650 13460 12682 13550 12469 13395 12468 13151
R2, percent 36.6 38.5 43.1 42.9 38.8 39.5 45.1 41.4 41.0 43.2
Note: a) Selection effect was calculated as ffmm λλ βλβλ ˆˆ − .
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Table 6. Gender wage differentials at various points of the log wage distribution
(standard errors in parentheses)
Year OLS
Mean
10th
Percentile
25th
Percentile
50th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
90th
Percentile
1993 0.226
(0.007)
0.182
(0.003)
0.193
(0.005)
0.234
(0.003)
0.256
(0.015)
0.255
(0.009)
1994 0.230
(0.006)
0.163
(0.002)
0.223
(0.001)
0.182
(0.002)
0.255
(0.013)
0.318
(0.008)
1995 0.220
(0.006)
0.122
(0.008)
0.138
(0.016)
0.223
(0.005)
0.318
(0.002)
0.306
(0.021)
1996 0.223
(0.006)
0.154
(0.004)
0.134
(0.003)
0.218
(0.020)
0.297
(0.005)
0.305
(0.014)
1997 0.218
(0.007)
0.127
(0.010)
0.174
(0.005)
0.262
(0.005)
0.256
(0.020)
0.276
(0.026)
Notes: The numbers in the table are the coefficients on an indicator variable for males from OLS and quantile regressions (at the indicated percentiles) of
log earnings on a constant and the dummy variable.
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Table 7. Educational distribution in 1993 and 1997
1993 1997Completed level of edu-
cation men,
%
Women,
%
women to
men ratio
men,
%
women,
%
women to
men ratio
University 9.8 8.5 0.7 9.1 9.4 0.8
Post-secondary 1.3 6.8 4.0 1.3 6.3 3.7
Secondary vocational 23.4 30.6 1.0 24.6 34.4 1.1
Secondary general 2.8 12.7 3.5 2.8 12.0 3.2
Basic vocational 45.8 24.9 0.4 49.2 25.9 0.4
Elementary 16.7 16.3 0.8 12.9 12.0 0.7
Incomplete elementary 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.1 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 0.8 100.0 100.0 0.8
N obs., persons 7554 5911 8249 6320
Table 8. Occupational distribution and average wages in 1997
Employment Wages, zlotys (std.dev)
persons percentCategories
men women men women
women
to men
ratio
men women
women
to men
ratio
Top managers 428 252 5.2 4.0 0.6 1255.5
(762.2)
942.8
(470.3)
0.75
Specialists 430 582 5.2 9.2 1.4 1166.2
(733.9)
864.2
(478.3)
0.74
Technicians 940 1418 11.4 22.4 1.5 910.6
(468.0)
637.8
(265.8)
0.70
Office employees 373 1230 4.5 19.5 3.3 670.7
(314.8)
606.2
(228.0)
0.90
Services 394 930 4.8 14.7 2.4 657.8
(299.0)
458.2
(141.1)
0.70
Farmers 113 32 1.4 0.5 0.3 577.6
(284.5)
438.0
(127.4)
0.76
Industrial workers 3354 715 40.7 11.3 0.2 683.9
(361.9)
490.3
(145.8)
0.72
Machinists 1538 239 18.6 3.8 0.2 695.0
(347.6)
588.6
(177.5)
0.85
Manual workers 679 922 8.2 14.6 1.4 535.9
(187.0)
446.6
(110.0)
0.83
Total 8249 6320 100.0 100.0 0.8 751.1
(451.6)
590.8
(288.8)
0.79
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Table 9. Industrial distribution and average wages in 1997
Employment Wages, zlotys (std.dev)
persons percentCategories
men women men women
women
to men
ratio
men women
women
to men
ratio
Agriculture and
hunting
367 106 4.4 1.7 0.3 614.3
(303.5)
560.7
(246.8)
0.91
Fishing 14 1 0.2 0.0 0.1 625.2
(195.8)
650.0 1.04
Mining 418 52 5.1 0.8 0.1 1022.8
(443.0)
653.6
(215.8)
0.64
Manufacturing 2809 1666 34.1 26.4 0.6 711.1
(347.8)
572.7
(260.5)
0.81
Energy supply 333 81 4.0 1.3 0.2 892.3
(649.4)
683.8
(225.0)
0.77
Construction 1077 90 13.1 1.4 0.1 680.1
(419.1)
734.5
(404.6)
1.08
Trade 708 939 8.6 14.9 1.3 702.4
(421.2)
539.2
(300.6)
0.77
Hotel 60 150 0.7 2.4 2.5 664.6
(377.8)
482.5
(123.9)
0.73
Transportation 830 394 10.1 6.2 0.5 753.0
(587.9)
626.2
(260.3)
0.83
Finance 115 267 1.4 4.2 2.3 928.8
(643.9)
755.4
(387.8)
0.81
Real estate 212 186 2.6 2.9 0.9 885.4
(642.5)
720.6
(484.9)
0.81
Public administra-
tion
637 481 7.7 7.6 0.8 899.9
(458.5)
730.4
(391.5)
0.81
Education 147 446 1.8 7.1 3.0 738.1
(324.9)
545.0
(198.0)
0.74
Health care 217 1202 2.6 19.0 5.5 645.0
(341.9)
545.1
(201.6)
0.85
Social services 239 235 2.9 3.7 1.0 723.4
(576.5)
588.3
(264.9)
0.81
Others 66 24 0.8 0.4 0.4 842.5
(339.7)
628.6
(271.9)
0.75
Total 8249 6320 100.0 100.0 0.8 751.1
(451.6)
590.8
(288.8)
0.79
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Chart 2. Different decomposition methods (Specification B)
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Chart 1. Different decomposition methods (Specification A)
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Chart 3. Wage gap decompositions (Method 4, Specifications A, B, and C)
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Chart 4. Components of the mean log wage differential in 1997 (Method 4, Specification B)
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
H
e
a
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
/
c
i
t
y
/
r
u
r
a
l
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
S
e
c
t
o
r
T
e
n
u
r
e
F
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
H
e
a
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
/
c
i
t
y
/
r
u
r
a
l
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
S
e
c
t
o
r
T
e
n
u
r
e
F
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
H
e
a
d
R
e
g
i
o
n
/
c
i
t
y
/
r
u
r
a
l
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
S
e
c
t
o
r
T
e
n
u
r
e
F
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
Explained                                                  Male advantage                                          Female 
disadvantage
M
e
a
n
 
l
o
g
 
w
a
g
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
43
Chart 5. Components of the mean log wage differential in 1997 (Method 4, Specification C)
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Chart 6. Changes in real log wages between 1993 and 1997
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Table A1. Earnings equation estimates for 1997 (Specification B)
Variables Mean Men Women
men women coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
University 0.091 0.094 0.474 (0.024) 0.439 (0.023)
Post-secondary 0.013 0.063 0.266 (0.035) 0.172 (0.022)
Secondary vocational 0.246 0.344 0.178 (0.015) 0.147 (0.016)
Secondary general 0.028 0.120 0.178 (0.025) 0.160 (0.018)
Basic vocational 0.492 0.259 0.086 (0.012) 0.055 (0.014)
Pot. experience, years 20.073 20.267 0.009 (0.002) 0.011 (0.002)
Pot. experience squared 507.877 510.322 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Married 0.773 0.739 0.051 (0.011) 0.007 (0.009)
Head of household 0.655 0.270 0.084 (0.010) 0.045 (0.009)
48 regional dummies Yes Yes
City (>100,000 resid.) 0.275 0.319 0.034 (0.028) 0.057 (0.027)
City (50,000-100,000) 0.113 0.114 -0.005 (0.029) -0.008 (0.028)
City (20,000-50,000) 0.124 0.134 -0.014 (0.029) -0.018 (0.028)
City (10,000-20,000) 0.080 0.087 -0.033 (0.030) -0.010 (0.029)
City (5,000-10,000) 0.038 0.044 -0.052 (0.033) 0.001 (0.031)
Rural 0.352 0.281 -0.033 (0.027) -0.015 (0.027)
Agriculture, hunting 0.044 0.017 -0.098 (0.021) -0.037 (0.034)
Fishing 0.002 0.000 -0.015 (0.091) 0.079 (0.283)
Mining 0.051 0.008 0.288 (0.020) 0.090 (0.041)
Energy supply 0.040 0.013 0.163 (0.019) 0.109 (0.033)
Construction 0.131 0.014 0.025 (0.012) 0.050 (0.031)
Trade 0.086 0.149 -0.013 (0.015) -0.049 (0.016)
Hotel and restaurants 0.007 0.024 -0.047 (0.044) -0.038 (0.026)
Transportation 0.101 0.062 0.010 (0.014) 0.011 (0.018)
Financial intermediary 0.014 0.042 0.019 (0.032) 0.087 (0.020)
Real estate 0.026 0.029 0.000 (0.024) -0.024 (0.023)
Public administration 0.077 0.076 0.064 (0.017) 0.047 (0.017)
Education 0.018 0.071 -0.218 (0.029) -0.136 (0.018)
Health care 0.026 0.190 -0.183 (0.024) -0.126 (0.014)
Social welfare 0.029 0.037 -0.026 (0.023) -0.067 (0.021)
Top manager 0.052 0.040 0.370 (0.024) 0.395 (0.023)
Specialist 0.052 0.092 0.227 (0.028) 0.267 (0.021)
Technician 0.114 0.224 0.221 (0.019) 0.212 (0.016)
Office clerk 0.045 0.195 0.056 (0.022) 0.136 (0.015)
Services 0.048 0.147 0.085 (0.022) 0.044 (0.016)
Farmer 0.014 0.005 0.111 (0.038) -0.034 (0.059)
Industrial worker 0.407 0.113 0.094 (0.014) 0.034 (0.016)
Machinist 0.186 0.038 0.134 (0.016) 0.170 (0.022)
Public sector 0.538 0.616 -0.051 (0.010) -0.047 (0.011)
Tenure at the current
workplace, years
9.716 10.426 0.004 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001)
Tenure squared 187.602 194.211 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Firm size (6-20 empl.) 0.176 0.172 0.013 (0.014) 0.044 (0.014)
Firm size (21-50) 0.145 0.166 0.058 (0.015) 0.085 (0.014)
Firm size (50-100) 0.111 0.117 0.050 (0.016) 0.077 (0.016)
Firm size (>100) 0.458 0.417 0.134 (0.014) 0.089 (0.014)
Constant 6.172 (0.038) 5.968 (0.038)
N obs. 8249 6320
R2, percent 40.8 43.0
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Table A2. Decomposition of the male-female wage differential, 1994-1996,
based upon Specification A-1 of the earnings equation (human capital and personal characteristics,
actual experience substituted for potential experience)
Year 1994 1995 1996
unexplained unexplained unexplained
Components
of the male-female
wage
differential
explained
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(A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Education -0.021 -0.019 -0.012 -0.020 -0.024 -0.016 -0.022 -0.014 0.001
Actual experience 0.004 0.011 -0.062 0.004 0.015 -0.062 0.004 0.023 -0.067
Married 0.003 0.019 0.033 0.002 0.026 0.033 0.003 0.012 0.031
Head of household 0.081 -0.064 0.037 0.076 -0.063 0.032 0.073 -0.056 0.034
Region/city/rural 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.032 0.047 -0.003 0.008 0.016
Constant 0.000 0.118 0.091 0.000 0.084 0.056 0.000 0.102 0.079
Total 0.068 0.070 0.092 0.061 0.070 0.089 0.055 0.074 0.094
Additional information Men Women Men Women Men Women
N obs. 8501 6440 8555 6690 8220 6488
R2, percent 32.9 33.8 28.8 30.4 34.3 33.1
Mean potential experience,
years (std.dev.)
20.3
(10.0)
20.2
(9.6)
20.2
(10.1)
20.4
(9.8)
20.3
(10.2)
20.6
(9.8)
Mean actual experience,
years (std.dev.)
18.1
(9.9)
16.7
(9.1)
18.1
(10.2)
16.9
(9.3)
18.2
(10.2)
17.1
(9.4)
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Table A3. Ordered probit estimates for 1997
Variables Mean Men Women
men women coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
Constant -3.255 (0.233) -5.382 (0.225)
Age, years 38.560 37.903 0.243 (0.011) 0.309 (0.011)
Age squared 1624.060 1549.930 -0.003 (0.000) -0.004 (0.000)
Married 0.727 0.752 0.271 (0.034) -0.385 (0.031)
Head of household 0.602 0.223 0.490 (0.032) 0.229 (0.032)
University 0.093 0.104 0.930 (0.058) 1.265 (0.051)
Post-secondary 0.014 0.058 0.380 (0.116) 0.868 (0.056)
Secondary vocational 0.226 0.280 0.416 (0.041) 0.626 (0.034)
Secondary general 0.031 0.109 0.250 (0.071) 0.502 (0.042)
Basic vocational 0.464 0.274 0.307 (0.035) 0.294 (0.033)
City (>100,000 resid.) 0.271 0.297 0.128 (0.033) 0.025 (0.027)
Rural 0.353 0.320 0.040 (0.030) -0.087 (0.027)
North 0.104 0.106 -0.170 (0.054) -0.098 (0.046)
North-east 0.055 0.056 -0.269 (0.065) -0.018 (0.059)
South 0.196 0.194 -0.047 (0.048) -0.076 (0.041)
Central 0.084 0.085 -0.083 (0.058) 0.012 (0.049)
South-west 0.115 0.117 -0.157 (0.052) -0.045 (0.045)
South-east 0.151 0.135 -0.093 (0.049) 0.119 (0.045)
Central-west 0.147 0.151 -0.060 (0.051) 0.005 (0.043)
Central-east 0.041 0.043 -0.292 (0.069) 0.041 (0.061)
Regime 0.190 0.199 0.365 (0.063) 0.581 (0.050)
Mu(1) 0.576 (0.015) 0.412 (0.009)
Mu(2) 0.689 (0.016) 0.524 (0.010)
N observations 12468 13151
